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1

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. section 78-2-2 (3)(j) (Supp. 1994).

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court properly hold that the court lacked
specific personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to Rule 12
(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When an issue involving specific personal jurisdiction is
decided on documentary evidence the standard of review is a
correction of error standard.

Arcruello v. Industrial Woodworking

Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992).

Anderson v. American

Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827
(Utah 1990), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 276 (1991).

See also

Kamdar & Company v. Laray Company, Inc., 815 P.2d 245 (Utah
Ct.App. 1991) .

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-22 (1992).

(See Appendix 1 ) .

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-23 (1992). (See Appendix 2 ) .
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-24 (Supp. 1994).

(See Appendix

3) .
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(2).

1

(See Appendix 4 ) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a case involving an alleged breach of a personal
guarantee.
B.

Proceedings Below.

Plaintiff filed his complaint in the Fourth District Court
on November 22, 1993.

(R. at 13-1).

Defendant was served on

December 7, 1993 in the State of Colorado. (R. at 14) .

Defendant

filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on
March 4, 1994.

(R. at 18-17).

There was no oral argument.

The

court entered a memorandum decision granting Defendant's motion
on April 26, 1994.

(R. at 166-163).

The order of dismissal was

entered on May 20, 1994. (R. at 170-169).
A notice of appeal was filed on June 20, 1994.

This case

was poured over from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals on
September 21, 1994 (R. at 178) .

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The original promissory note in this matter for $101,500 was
assigned to plaintiff on June 24, 1975.

(R. at 12).

On the

25th of September, 1975 defendant personally guaranteed the note
and agreed to pay an additional 1% interest in exchange for an
agreement to waive certain prior security agreements.

(R. at 5-

4, 12) .
The September 25, 1975 guarantee was finalized by
defendant's signature in Colorado.
2

(R. at 5-4).

Plaintiff later

acknowledged receipt of the guarantee.

Defendant signed the

agreement in Colorado, and all previous agreements were signed in
Colorado.

The agreement does not mention performance anywhere

outside the State of Colorado.
Plaintiff brought this action to compel payment of balances
which he claims are due under the note and personal guarantee.
(R. at 12) .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The standard of review in cases where specific personal
jurisdiction is at issue depends on how the case was decided in
the trial court.

The case at bar was decided based on the

complaint and the exhibits which accompanied it.
were ever offered by either side.

No affidavits

The standard of review is

therefore a correction of error standard.
The complaint contains a single statement which would go to
specific personal jurisdiction.

The statement is found in

paragraph 3 of the complaint which states: "the agreements which
are the subject of this action were entered into and are intended
to be performed in the State of Utah."

(R. at 13). Where

documents alone are used for determining jurisdiction, only a
prima facie demonstration of jurisdiction is required.
The statement above is not sufficient to make the required
prima facie demonstration when considered in light of the
documents which were attached to the Complaint as exhibits.
These exhibits include the personal guarantee which is the
3

subject of this action.

Examination of the documents clearly

demonstrates that there is no expressed or implied place of
performance outside the state of Colorado.
When specific personal jurisdiction is being examined there
are two points which must be satisfied.

The first requirement is

that the defendant have performed some act within the State of
Utah which is enumerated in the Long Arm Statute.

The second

requirement is that the defendant's contacts with Utah be
sufficient to allow jurisdiction to be exercised without
violating the due process rights of the defendant.

The plaintiff

has clearly failed to plead sufficiently to satisfy either the
Long Arm Statute or due process in the complaint and attached
document.

Plaintiff has failed to plead the required nexus

between the defendant, the cause of action, and the forum.

He

has also failed to plead regarding how maintenance of this action
in Utah will not violate the due process rights of the defendant.
Plaintiff argues in his brief that approximately 115 pages
of alleged correspondence between the parties should be
considered in determining whether specific personal jurisdiction
exists.

The documents are not self authenticating, and are not

supported by an affidavit.

They therefore have no evidentiary

value and should not be considered.
Even if the correspondence were considered in determining
whether jurisdiction was proper, it does not demonstrate that
defendant transacted business in Utah as required under the Long
Arm Statute.

(If anything, the correspondence would go to
4

whether defendant was doing business in Utah.

In his brief,

plaintiff indicates that he is not claiming that defendant was
doing business.

Brief of Appellant at 7 ) . Plaintiff's complaint

also fails to demonstrate that there is a nexus between the
defendant, the forum and the litigation, and that defendant's due
process rights will not be violated .
Even if the court were to find that defendant had transacted
business in Utah, there is no demonstration nor pleading
regarding due process.

Without pleading that due process will be

satisfied, plaintiff's complaint against a resident of another
state cannot stand.

The trial court must therefore be affirmed.

ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Standard of review in cases where a trial court has

granted a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is
dependent on how the trial court has handled the motion.

If

there was an evidentiary hearing held, it is a clearly erroneous
standard.

If, as here, the case is decided on documentary

evidence, it is a correction of error standard.

Arcruello v

Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992) .
Anderson v. American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive
Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct.
276 (1991).

See also Kamdar & Company vs Laray Company, Inc.,

815 P.2d 245 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).
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II.

ISSUE FOR REVIEW:
The plaintiff in the case at bar has appealed, and has

briefed a single issue.

The issue is whether the trial court has

specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

1

In

determining whether specific personal jurisdiction exists, trial
courts have several options for determining jurisdiction.

In

Anderson v. American Soc. of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827
(Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the approach used by
the Federal Courts.
In the federal trial court's discretion, under rule 12 it
may determine jurisdiction on affidavits alone, permit
discovery, or hold an evidentiary hearing. If it proceeds
on documentary evidence alone (ie the first two methods),
the plaintiff is only required to make a prima facie showing
of personal jurisdiction.
Anderson, at 827.
1

.
In the case at bar, the only issue before the court is
whether the trial court had specific personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.
(See plaintiff's brief at 7) At the trial level the
defendant seemed to be mixing the analysis of general personal
jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction.
The confusion
comes because for a time, Utah courts blurred the distinction
between general personal jurisdiction and specific . personal
jurisdiction. In Abbott G.M. Diesel v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d
850 (Utah 1978) the Utah Supreme Court distinguished between
"general"
personal
jurisdiction
and
"specific"
personal
jurisdiction.
Essentially,
general
jurisdiction
is
the
jurisdiction used in a "doing business statute." Specific personal
jurisdiction is the kind of jurisdiction examined when a minimum
contacts test is applied.
Where
a defendant's
forum-state
activity
is
extensive, the forum may assert personal jurisdiction in
either related or unrelated claims (doing business
concept). Where the defendant has only minimum contacts
with the forum, personal jurisdiction may be asserted
only on claims arising out of the defendant's forum-state
activity, (long arm or transaction of business concept.) .
Nova Mud Corporation, v. L. H. Fletcher, 64 8 F. Supp.
1123 (U.S. Dist. Ct. District of Utah Central Division).
6

In the case at bar, the trial court decided the matter based
exclusively on documentary evidence.

The only documents before

the court were the complaint and the documents attached to it as
exhibits.

(In its response to defendant's motion to dismiss,

plaintiff included numerous documents.

These documents were not

in affidavit form, and were not authenticated in any way.)

In

considering plaintiff's appeal, the only documents which are
before the court are the complaint and the documents attached as
exhibits.

III. PLAINTIFF'S PLEADINGS DO NOT ESTABLISH A PFTMA FACIE
DEMONSTRATION OF JURISDICTION.
The allegations regarding jurisdiction which are in
plaintiff's complaint are contained in the first five paragraphs
of the Complaint.
1.
2.

(R. at 13). Those paragraphs are as follows:

4.

Plaintiff is an individual residing in Utah County.
Defendant is an individual residing in the State of
Colorado.
The agreements which are the subject of this action
were entered into and intended to be performed in the
State of Utah.
The amount in controversy is in excess of $20,000.00.

5.

Jurisdiction and venue are proper before this court.

3.

(R. at 12) .
The remaining allegations of the complaint do not address
jurisdiction.
In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court held that where
jurisdiction is being decided on the basis of documents alone,
plaintiff must make only a "prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction."

Anderson, at 827.
7

Because neither side submitted

affidavits, the facts within the complaint and the accompanying
exhibits must be considered.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-part inquiry to
determine whether Utah courts have personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents.

Kamdar & Company v. Boal, 815 P.2d 245, 165 Utah

Adv. Rep. 9 (1991) . Anderson v. American Soc. of Plastic
Surgeons. 148 Utah Adv. Rep 3 (Utah 1990).
763 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1988).

Bradford v. Nagle,

The first part of the inquiry

requires that, claims must arise from one of the activities
enumerated in the Utah long-arm statute.

The second inquiry

requires that: "the defendant's contacts with Utah must be
sufficient to allow jurisdiction to be exercised without
violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution."

Kamdar, at 245.

These

notions are set forth in detail in Arguello v. Industrial
Woodworking Machine Co., where the court stated:
Generally, whether a state can exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is determined by
two factors: the breadth of the forum state's
jurisdictional statute and the due process limitations on
jurisdiction imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. See Parry v. Ernst Home Center
Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 661 (Utah 1989); Bradford V. Nagle,
763 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1988). If the relevant state
statute does not permit jurisdiction, then the inquiry is
ended; if it does, then the question is whether the
statute's reach comports with due process. Bradford, 763
P.2d at 793 (quoting 2 James W. Moore, Moore's Federal
Practice, P. 4.41-1[4], at 4-335 to -336 (2d ed. 1988)).
Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120
(Utah 1992) .

8

In applying the principles set forth above to the facts of
the case at bar, the first inquiry which this court must make to
determine whether jurisdiction is proper is whether the
activities of the defendant fall within the breadth of the long
arm statute.

The pertinent portion of the long arm statute is

found in U.C.A. 78-27-24 (1953 as amended).
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or
not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts,
submits himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state as to any claim arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; . . .
Utah law provides a definition of "transaction of business
within this state."

UCA 78-27-23 states in pertinent part:

(2)

"The words 'transaction of business within this state' mean
activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or
representatives in this state which affect persons or businesses
within the state of Utah."
In construing the above statute, what is examined is whether
a nexus exists between the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's
conduct within the state of Utah.

For personal jurisdiction to

exist, Utah law requires that the conduct complained of by
Plaintiff arises out of defendant's contact with the state.

IV.

THE EXHIBITS ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
AGREEMENT WAS TO BE PERFORMED IN COLORADO.
Examination of the complaint and the accompanying exhibits

makes it clear that the "transaction of any business" requirement
9

of the long arm statute has not been met.

Paragraph 2 of the

complaint indicates that defendant is a resident of the State of
Colorado.

Paragraph 3 of the complaint indicates that "the

agreements which are the subject of this action were entered into
and are intended to be performed in the State of Utah." (R. at
13).

The balance of the numbered paragraphs of the complaint

contain the amount in controversy, a statement concluding that
jurisdiction and venue are proper, and a description of the
history of the transactions which allegedly took place between
the parties.
On page 8 of Appellant's Brief, plaintiff argues that
paragraph 3 of the complaint is sufficient standing alone to
establish that defendant transacted business in the State of Utah
sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the long arm statute.
Plaintiff's argument is incorrect for two reasons.

First,

paragraph 3 is not pleading a fact, it is a legal conclusion.
Secondly, paragraph 3 does not stand alone.

In addition to

filing a complaint, the plaintiff in this matter filed several
exhibits as part of the complaint.

(R. at 10-1).

Examination of

the exhibits makes it plain that the conclusion in paragraph 3 is
incorrect and that the agreements were entered into in the State
of Colorado and were intended to be performed in the State of
Colorado.
Exhibit number 1 of plaintiff's complaint is the original
promissory note which lies at the heart of this matter.
10).

The note says "Denver Colorado" at the top.
10

(R. at

Review of the

note reveals that it is secured by real property located in the
State of Colorado.

(R. at 9 ) .

Exhibit number 2 of plaintiff's complaint is the assignment
of the note to the defendant.

(R. at 7 ) . The assignment was

notarized in Colorado.
Exhibit number 3 of plaintiff's complaint is the assignment
to plaintiff notarized in Denver, Colorado.
Exhibit number 4 of plaintiff's complaint is a letter which
defendant allegedly sent to plaintiff.
discuss terms of the personal guarantee.

This letter appears to
(R. at 5 ) .

signed by defendant in the State of Colorado.

It was

The contents of

the letter, however, were "noted and acknowledged" by plaintiffs
in Utah.
The final two exhibits of plaintiff's complaint were both
signed by defendant in the State of Colorado, and consist of
letters which accompanied payments pursuant to the personal
guarantee.

(R. at 3-1).

None of the documents indicate in any way that they are to
be performed in the State of Utah.

The closest arguable

connection with Utah is the signature of plaintiff on exhibit
number 4.

This signature is not helpful to plaintiff because it

is the conduct of defendant rather than plaintiff which is
examined in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists.

In

making this determination courts must analyze the relationship of
the defendant, the forum and the litigation to each other.
Mallory Encrineerincr v. Ted R. Brown & Associates, 618 P.2d 1004,
11

1007 (1980).

The exhibits clearly demonstrate that the defendant

executed the agreements in Colorado.
Plaintiff may attempt to argue that defendant having
contracted with a Utah resident is sufficient to invoke
jurisdiction.
issue.

The Utah Federal Court has decided this exact

In STV International Marketing v. Cannondale Corp., 750

F. Supp 1070, 1077 (D. Utah 1990), the court held:
The nexus requirement is not met whenever there is creation
or breach of a contract with a Utah plaintiff. Nor would
the circumstance of presence in Utah by way of
correspondence and telephone calls, without more necessarily
be sufficient to satisfy nexus.
STV, at 1077.
Plaintiff may also argue that mailing exhibits 5 and 6 to
Utah is sufficient to create jurisdiction under the Long Arm
Statute.

Simply placing an executed agreement in the mail is not

sufficient to invoke jurisdiction.

STV International Marketing

v. Cannondale Corp., 750 F. Supp 1070. 1077 (D. Utah 1990).
In analyzing the complaint and the accompanying documents it
is evident that the requirements of the long arm statute have not
been pled.

Where the requirements of the statute are not met, no

further inquiry is necessary.

Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking

Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992).

V.

PLAINTIFF'S ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS FAIL TO ESTABLISH
JURISDICTION.
Because the complaint and the supporting exhibits fail to

satisfy the requirements of the long arm statute, defendant in
his Motion to Dismiss in the trial court did not file affidavits
12

or other documents.

(R. at 24) . Along with his Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff filed
approximately 115 pages of correspondence as exhibits.

These

documents appear to consist primarily of letters which
accompanied payments on the personal guarantee.

The letters were

sent over the course of at least 15 years by defendant to
plaintiff and his wife who were friends of defendant.
135-29).

(R. at

None of the documents are supported by affidavits, nor

are they authenticated in any way.
In Appellant's Brief, plaintiff argues that although the
exhibits were not affirmed by affidavit, they should be accepted
because there was no objection to the exhibits.

Plaintiff

further argues that because there was no objection, the
evidentiary defects were waived.
Plaintiff's arguments are in error.

Defendant's responded

to the these documents by indicating that they were "meaningless
in determining whether Defendant transacted business in Utah."
(R. at 156). Because the documents were not authenticated or
supported by affidavit, no further response was necessary as the
documents carried no evidentiary weight.
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development, 659 P.2d 1040,
1044 (Utah 1983), which plaintiff cites for the proposition that
defendants have waived any evidentiary defects has nothing to do
with the unsupported documents in the case at bar.

Franklin

stands for the proposition that on a summary judgment motion if
an opposing party fails to move to strike defective affidavits,
13

he is deemed to waive any evidentiary defects.

Franklin at 1044.

In the case at bar, there were no affidavits of any kind, only
unsupported documents.

No motion to strike was necessary.

The

case at bar was not a motion for summary judgment, rather it was
a motion to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction and as such,
the motion to dismiss was being decided solely on the complaint
and supporting exhibits.
Even if the court determines that the correspondence should
be considered in determining whether specific personal
jurisdiction exists, these documents do not change the fact that
defendant has not transacted business within the State of Utah
nor do his actions have any nexus with the State of Utah.
This is illustrated by a simple example from common
experience.

This case is exactly like the situation when a home

owner makes mortgage payments to an out of state mortgage holder.
The mortgage may be sold or assigned to other mortgage holders in
other states.

Regardless of where the mortgage is held, any

action against the homeowner on the mortgage must be brought
where the mortgagor resides as no other court would have
jurisdiction.
The same is true in the case at bar, payments and
correspondence would have taken place regardless of what state
the plaintiff happened to live in.

Correspondence and payments

do not magically create specific personal jurisdiction.
In Far West Capital, Inc., vs Dorothy A. Towne and Fleetwood
Corporation, 828 F. Supp 909 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Utah Cent. Div.
14

1993), which had facts in some ways similar to the case at bar,
(ie. substantial correspondence) the court concluded that despite
a three year negotiation process including numerous facsimile
transmissions, mailings and phone calls between the parties,
there was no nexus with the state sufficient to establish
specific personal jurisdiction.

The court stated:

The Court concludes that the nature of such contacts when
compared to the three year process of negotiations, much of
which took place in person, is insufficient to satisfy the
nexus requirement of Utah's long arm statute."
In the case at bar the contacts illustrated by the correspondence
were less intensive than in Far West, and took place over a span
of approximately 15 years.
those circumstances.

Certainly no nexus was created under

Without such a nexus, specific personal

jurisdiction cannot exist.

VI.

DEFENDANTS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WILL BE VIOLATED.
The final requirement for determining whether or not

specific personal jurisdiction exists is to determine whether
requiring defendant to defend an action in a particular state
comports with due process requirements.
analysis.

This is a two part

The first part of the analysis is to determine whether

the defendant purposely availed himself of the privilege of doing
business in the forum state.

The second part of the analysis is

to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction satisfies the
demands of fair play and substantial justice.

The purpose behind

this due process analysis is to ensure that a defendant can be
required to defend an action outside his home state only "where
15

he should reasonable anticipate out of state litigation."
750 F. supp. at 1077.

STV,

The contacts which the defendant has with

the state must be "such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there."

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,

471 U.S. 462, 474, 85 L. Ed. 2d. 528, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (Quoting
World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 44 U.S. at 297).
Entering into a contract with a resident of a state, without
more, is an insufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction
within that state.

Nicholas v. Buchanan, 806 F.2d 305, 307 (1st

Cir. 1986).
The Utah Court of Appeals in Kamdar set forth the
requirements that must be met to satisfy a non-resident
defendant's due process rights.

The Court stated:

In order to satisfy due process requirements, a defendant's
contacts with Utah must be "such that maintenance of a suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 343
(194 0)). Accordingly, the defendants must have "purposely
availed" themselves of the privilege of conducting
activities here, Anderson, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5.
(quoting Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct.
12287, 1240 (1958)), and they must have "reasonably
anticipated being haled into court here." Id. (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297,
100 S. Ct. 559, 567 (1980). We must also balance "the
convenience of the parties and the interests of the State in
assuming jurisdiction," Mallory Engineering v. Ted R. Brown
& Assoc. . 618 P.@d 1004, 1008 (Utah 1980) (Citations
omitted), by examining "the relationship of the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation, to each other." Id. at 1007
(citations omitted).
One factor in determining whether or not a nonresident
defendant has purposely availed himself of the privileges and

16

protections of the laws of a particular forum state requires
inquiry into the nature of the relationship.
Purposeful availment analysis turns upon whether the
defendant contacts are attributable to his own actions or
solely to the actions of the plaintiff. . . . [and
generally] requires . . . affirmative conduct by the
defendant which allows or promotes the transaction of
business within the forum state.
STV, 750 F. Supp. at 1078 (quoting Rambo Insurance Co., 839 F.2d
1475, 1418,-19).
In the case at bar, there are no actions attributable to the
defendant set forth in the complaint or the accompanying exhibits
in which he is alleged to have availed himself of the privilege
of doing business in Utah.

The only contacts the defendant has

with Utah are completely coincidental, because the plaintiff
happens to live in the State of Utah.

Defendant has not

purposely reached out of Colorado and done any act in Utah which
would be sufficient for minimum contacts purposes.

Because the

complaint, or the accompanying documents completely fail to plead
any purposeful availment of the privilege of doing business in
Utah, personal jurisdiction based upon those documents cannot
exist.
Plaintiff may argue that defendant has purposely availed
himself of the protection of the law of the State of Utah because
he has contracted with a Utah resident.
taken by the plaintiffs in Far West.

That was the position
In response to this

position the court stated:
To adopt plaintiffs' reasoning would essentially embrace a
rule that the mere formation of a contract with a resident
of another state automatically subjects the nonresident to
17

the jurisdiction if that other state. Such a rule would
effectively eviscerate the due process requirement.
Far West Capital, Inc., et al. , vs Dorothy A. Towne and Fleetwood
Corporation 838 F. Supp. 909 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Utah Cent. Div.
1993).
The final analysis involves fair play and substantial
justice.

Respecting the fair play and substantial justice part

of this analysis the United States Supreme Court has said:
Courts . . . may evaluate the burden on the defendant, the
forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies.
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (Quoting World Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292).
Plaintiff has not pled that defendant in this matter has any
contacts with the State of Utah.

Even the additional exhibits,

which plaintiff argues the court should consider, only
demonstrate payments and correspondence.

The promissory note

which underlies this matter was executed in Colorado.
secured real property is in Colorado.

The

The personal guarantees

upon which plaintiff is basing this action were executed by
defendant in Colorado.

The only contacts defendant had with the

state of Utah involved sending payments and correspondence into
the state over a 15 year course of dealing between the parties.
Keeping in mind that the analysis looks at the actions of the
defendant, not the plaintiff, there is nothing about the
relationship between the parties which gives the Courts of the
State of Utah specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
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If defendant is haled into court in Utah his due process rights
will clearly be violated.
Even if the court were to hold that the complaint and its
accompanying exhibits along with the correspondence referred to
by plaintiff demonstrate that defendant has contacts with the
State of Utah, they are not of the quality required to find
specific personal jurisdiction.
. . . . Whether due process is satisfied must depend
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause
to insure.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington 326 U.S. 319, 316, 66 S. Ct.
154, 158 (1945).
Defendant has done nothing to specifically bring himself under
the protection of the laws of the State of Utah.

Any connection

defendant has with the State of Utah is merely coincidental
because plaintiff lives here.

The personal guarantee which is

the subject of this action was signed by plaintiff in Colorado,
was based on real property in Colorado, and was intended to be
performed in Colorado.

There is no connection between this

litigation and the State of Utah of the quality and nature that
would allow the exercise of jurisdiction in this forum.

The

order of the trial court dismissing this matter must therefore be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The standard of review in this matter is a correctness
standard as the case was decided based on documents.
19

Because

there were no affidavits submitted by either side, the only
documents which are properly before the court are the complaint
and the exhibits which accompany it.

Based on those documents,

it is clear that defendant has not transacted business in Utah;
that there is no nexus between the defendant, the forum and the
litigation, and that the due process rights of the defendant are
not being protected.
Even if the correspondence submitted by plaintiff is
considered, the required tests for finding specific personal
jurisdiction have not been satisfied.

Because those tests cannot

be satisfied, the defendant cannot be required to defend this
action in the State of Utah.

Defendant therefore respectfully

requests that the decision of the trial court dismissing this
action for lack of personal jurisdiction be affirmed.
DATED THIS

<5ffi( day of February, 1995.
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND P.C.

J." GRANT MOODY^T?
DONALD E. McCANDLESS
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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78-27-22. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Purpose of
provision.
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public
interest demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of
redress against nonresident persons, who, through certain significant minimal contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's
protection. This legislative action is deemed necessary because of technological progress which has substantially increased the flow of commerce between
the several states resulting in increased interaction between persons of this
state and persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to citizens of this
state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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78-27-23. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) The words "any person" mean any individual, firm, company, association, or corporation.
(2) The words "transaction of business within this state" mean activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state
which affect persons or businesses within the state of Utah.
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78*27*24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts submitting person to jurisdiction.
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a citizen
or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the
foUowing enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim
arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by
breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this
state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within
this state at the time of contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child
support, having resided, in the marital relationship, within this state
notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state; or the commission
in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendant had
no control; or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives
rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to determine paternity
for the purpose of establishing responsibility for child support.
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25

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed
by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of
the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d> Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such
order as it deems just.

(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be
deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.)

